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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mellisa Estrada appeals from her judgment of conviction for forgery and grand theft of a
financial instrument.

She contends that during her jury trial, the district court made two

erroneous evidentiary rulings. First, the court erred under in allowing the State to introduce
irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial evidence-testimony that she was fired from her job (for reasons
wholly unrelated to the circumstances underlying this case). Second, she argues the court erred
in allowing the State to introduce evidence that her former employer took subsequent remedial
measures, modifying its policies and procedures, in response to her alleged crimes.
The State presents a number of arguments relating to each issue on appeal. This Reply
Brief addresses two of those arguments.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were detailed m Ms. Estrada's
Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated here.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial,
and confusing evidence that Ms. Estrada was fired from Safe Passage?

II.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to introduce evidence that Safe Passage
modified its housing funding request policies in response to this alleged incident?

2

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred And Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce
Irrelevant, Unfairly Prejudicial, And Confusing Evidence That Ms. Estrada Was Fired From Safe
Passage
Ms. Estrada contends the district court erred in denying her motion in limine seeking to
exclude evidence that she was fired from Safe Passage. (App. Br., pp.4-7.) Specifically, she
argues that testimony concerning her termination from Safe Passage-which preceded any
allegations of criminality by Safe Passage, and was wholly unrelated to the crimes at issue in this
case-was inadmissible under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404(b).

(App.

Br., pp.4-7.)
In response, the State argues evidence of Ms. Estrada's firing was relevant, it was not
unfairly prejudicial, and, even if the court erred, any such error was harmless.

(See Resp.

Br., pp.7-13.) In this Reply Brief, Ms. Estrada will address only the State's relevance argument.
The State contends that evidence of Ms. Estrada's unrelated firing was relevant because it
explained why other Safe Passage employees cleaned out Ms. Estrada's desk. (Resp. Br., pp.910.) In furtherance of this argument, the State cites State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 470 P.3d 1162
(2020), for the proposition that context-why someone did something that led to the discovery of
incriminating evidence-is necessarily relevant:
In a similar analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that, under I.R.E.
404(b ), testimony that the defendant was on probation was relevant to explain to
the jury why officers searched his underwear, stating:
In the present case, the district court admitted the probation
evidence, not for a propensity purpose, but to provide context for
the search. We agree that the probation evidence was relevant for
the non-propensity purpose of explaining the police officers'
actions. Like in [State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476
(2008)], where evidence of an outstanding arrest warrant was
relevant to explaining why police officers searched the defendant's
3

vehicle, here, evidence that Jones was on probation is relevant to
explaining why the police officers searched his underwear.

The disputed testimony in both Jones and in Estrada's trial was relevant in
explaining why searches were properly conducted, leading to the seizure of
incriminating evidence.
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10 (quoting Jones, 470 P.3d at 1169) (alteration original).)
The State's reliance on Jones, however, is misplaced. The above quote is from the lead
opinion in the case; however, that opinion was not the majority opinion insofar as it found
context to be relevant, as that portion of the lead opinion only garnered two justices' votes. See
Jones, 470 P.3d at 1165-75 (indicating that only Justice Bevan fully concurred with Chief Justice

Burdick's lead opinion). Thus, the quoted language relied upon by the State does not represent
the holding of the Court.
In fact, a majority of the justices in Jones explicitly rejected the proposition relied upon
by the State in this case. See id. at 1175-76 (indicating the Justices Brody and Moeller fully
concurred with Justice Stegner's opinion). 1 The majority explained that "context," i.e., the
reason why the officers conducted their search, was not relevant because those reasons were not
"facts of consequence in determining this action." Id. at 1175. The majority took the view that
this context rationale was little more than a re-packaging of the res gestae doctrine, which the
Court had rejected in State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569 (2017). Id. at 1175-76. Thus, the
majority reiterated that "contextual justifications like those offered in Yakovac," and relied upon

1

In Justices Stegner's concurring opinion, he repeatedly described Chief Justice Burdick's lead
opinion as the "majority" opinion. See Jones, 470 P.3d at 1175-76. That may be an accurate
descriptor in most respects, as Chief Justice Burdick's opinion presumably garnered unanimous
support as to its other holdings (although this is not explicit anywhere in either of the opinions).
However, Chief Justice Burdick's lead opinion cannot accurately be described as a "majority"
opinion on the narrow question of whether "context" is relevant evidence.
4

by the lead opinion, "are inadmissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence." Id. at 1176. This
was the true holding of Jones, and this holding supports Ms. Estrada's position, not the State's. 2
The fact is that Ms. Estrada's prior firing for unrelated reasons is completely irrelevant to
whether she committed any crimes. See I.R.E. 201 (defining relevant evidence as that which
"has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,"
where that "fact is of consequence in determining the action"). Even if we assume that her firing
provides a reason why Safe Passage employees cleaned out Ms. Estrada's desk, under Jones, the
reason itself is plainly irrelevant.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce Irrelevant
Evidence That Safe Passages Modified Its Housing Funding Request Policies In Response To
This Alleged Incident
Ms. Estrada also contends the district court erred m overruling her objection to
testimony concerning Safe Passages' modification of its policies and procedures in response to
her alleged crimes. (App. Br., pp.7-9.) She argues that, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 407,
evidence of such subsequent remedial measures was inadmissible to prove her criminal liability.
(App. Br., pp.7-9.)
In response, the State makes no effort to defend the district court's ruling under Rule 407.

(See Resp. Br., pp.13-19.) It argues only that Ms. Estrada's argument was not preserved below

2

Employing analogous reasoning, the Supreme Court has cautioned against admission of what
would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay in order to show "the effect on the listener":
In limited circumstances inadmissible hearsay might be admissible to show the
effect on the lister, but generally the evidence submitted is not relevant. The
effect on the listener exception is often used as a ruse to put inadmissible evidence
before the jury improperly. . . . [T]he effect on the listener must be relevant and
what prompted a call to the police is not relevant.

State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 145 (2014).
5

(Resp. Br., pp.13-18) or, alternatively, any error by the district court was harmless (Resp.
Br., pp.18-19). This Reply Brief addresses the State's preservation argument.
The State's preservation argument is based on an apparent misreading of the trial
transcript. At trial, the prosecutor's re-direct examination of Chauntelle Lieske, the Safe Passage
executive director, began as follows:
Q. . . . . When this was discovered back in June of 2018 [referring to
Ms. Estrada's alleged crimes], did Safe Passage seek to revamp their housing
assistance request program?
MS. HOWE [defense counsel]: Judge, objection under rule of evidence
regarding remedial measures. I think it's not admissible.
THE COURT: Overruled on those grounds.
THE WITNESS: Yes, we did.
(Tr., p.329, L.20 - p.330, L.2.)
The State characterizes the district court's ruling ("Overruled on those grounds") as
overruling defense counsel's objection "because it [the objection] lacked specificity" and was
vague. (Resp. Br., p.16.) That is not a fair reading of the transcript. Defense counsel objected
based on the Rule of Evidence regarding remedial measures. (Tr., p.329, Ls.23-25.) Even if
counsel could not immediately recall the number of the Rule, her objection was clearly and
unequivocally a reference to Idaho Rule of Evidence 407, which is entitled, "Subsequent
Remedial Measures," and goes on to say that such evidence is not admissible to prove culpable
conduct. There was absolutely no vagueness or lack of specificity in counsel's objection, and the
objection was more than adequate to preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. Hall, 163 Idaho
744, 772-73 (2018) (noting that an issue is preserved for appeal if there is a clearly-stated
objection or if the basis of the objection is apparent from the context). Further, the district
court's response in no way suggests that it found counsel's objection to be unclear. The court
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stated, "Overruled on those grounds." (Tr., p.330, L.1.) In context, "those grounds" are the
grounds stated by defense counsel, i.e., Rule 407.
Since Ms. Estrada's argument under Rule 407 was preserved for appeal, and the State
presents no defense of the district court's ruling, this Court should hold that the district court
erred in overruling Ms. Estrada's Rule 407 objection.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Estrada respectfully
requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and remand this case to the district
court for a new trial.
DATED this 12th day ofNovember, 2020.

I sf Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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Administrative Assistant
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